WHAT IS LIVED WHEN WE ARE LIVING IN OUR LIVED EXPERIENCE
IN THE LIVING PRESENT OF OUR OWN TRANSCENDENTAL LIFE?¹

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... las peculiaridades o manías del lenguaje de Husserl ... la pesantez de su afán por
introducir distinciones que parecen planeadas para desesperar a los más pacientes ....
(Zirión 2003, 379)

§1. THE QUESTION OF RECEIVED TERMINOLOGY

In Der Begriff des Erlebens—a text completed by the early 1930s but not
published until well after his death²—Ludwig Landgrebe opens his expo-
sition by addressing the question of philosophical terminology: a term
or a phrase may be taken out of its original context in everyday language
and used within a philosophical context, yet the pre-philosophical meaning
may continue to echo through the words (Landgrebe 2010, 15). Moreover,
it may be the case that as a tradition develops (here, the phenomenological
tradition), later generations may tend to take its key concepts for grant-
ed, appropriating its received terms and phrases as “working notions” (cf.
Behnke 2010b) without ever questioning the resonances they bear.³ On
the other hand, it is not just that everyday language may be taken up into
philosophical language; the language and concepts of specialists may also

¹ This interim research report is a preparatory study for the “lived” section of a chapter
entitled “On the Terms of the Title” meant for a work in progress, This Body Lived From
Within: A Phenomenological Journey. I am happy to dedicate the present essay to my
fellow researcher Antonio Zirión, with thanks not only for his original phenomenological
analyses, but also for his careful attention to the locutions and the language(s) through
which we do phenomenology together.

² See the “Nachwort” by Karel Novotný and Hans Rainer Sepp in Landgrebe 2010,
209ff., for the early history of this text and its recovery from the Patočka Archives in Prague.

³ In contrast, consider Antonio Zirión’s exemplary interrogations of the well-known
slogan, “Zu den Sachen selbst,” with regard to Husserlian phenomenology (see Xolocotzi
and Zirión 2018 for details of the ensuing debate).
“flow back into” an everyday context.4 But whatever direction these migrations may move, it may be necessary for a phenomenological researcher concerned with how language shapes our investigations to act, as Landgrebe (2010, 16) says, as a kind of customs official alert for hidden meanings “smuggled” in either direction across the admittedly fluid border between the lifeworld and the realm of phenomenological practice. And the notion of “lived experience” (Erlebnis) has a healthy history of such border crossings.

For example, although “lived experience” is a recognized English translation of Erlebnis,5 and thus a familiar term to phenomenologists, in recent years the notion of the “lived” has been appearing with increasing frequency on English-speaking radio in Canada and the United States, used quite casually, with no mention of a possible technical provenance. I have heard, for instance, references to the “lived” reality of those living in a homeless camp or of those living through the virus pandemic in New York City, with the word “lived” clearly connoting “experiencing something for oneself, firsthand”—a nuance that persists even in cases where such concrete, first-person experience is precisely what is lacking, as when a politician implores members of a certain privileged group to try to understand the “lived experience” of another group of people whose everyday life is unimaginably different from that of the privileged group (and yes, “lived experience” was the precise term used here and on a number of other occa-

4 Husserl emphasizes that all cultural achievements—including but not limited to those of the objective sciences—can flow back into the lifeworld that was their original ground, particularly when something newly understood is given a name that “immediately flows into the common language” (6/213; cf. 115). This, however, also holds good for the acquisitions of phenomenology itself, including transcendental phenomenology (6/§59; 29/Text Nr. 7), which may forge a new language in which ordinary words are used, but with transformed meanings (6/214; 15/389f.). All citations in the latter form refer to Husserliana (Husserl 1950ff.), cited by volume number / page, section, or text number(s); the same convention will be used, preceded by HM, for Husserliana Materialien (Husserl 2001ff.), while BW refers to the Briefwechsel (Husserl 1994) and EU to Erfahrung und Urteil (Husserl 1939).

5 Here it is not possible to present a full history of the fortunes of this term in English. Boyce Gibson’s 1931 translation of Ideen I simply renders it as “experience,” but Churchill’s 1964 translation of the time lectures uses “lived experience,” possibly influenced not only by the etymological connection between Leben and Erleben, but also by Ricoeur’s 1950 French translation of Ideen I, where the verb erleben is rendered as “vivre” and the noun Erlebnis as “vécu,” with the latter also appearing in Bachelard’s 1957 French translation of Formale und transzendentale Logik. Findlay’s 1970 translation of Logische Untersuchungen varies—there are places where Erlebnis is translated as “lived experience,” but he occasionally uses “lived through” for erlebt. In his 1969 translation of Formale und transzendentale Logik, Cairns renders Erlebnis as “process” or “life-process,” but by the time of his Guide for Translating Husserl (Cairns 1976), the recommended translation of Erlebnis is “mental process,” although “lived” is still mentioned for erlebt, along with other choices suggesting that what is erlebt is “undergone (mentally)” or is “(really) immanent in one’s (mental) life (or in one’s stream of mental processes).”
sions I shall not pause to document). Yet whatever the route may be through
which such locutions have seeped into everyday discourse, this usage is in-
deed consistent with the way the term “lived” has long been drawn upon in
phenomenological psychology and related approaches who see their task
as bringing to light the tacit structures of the lifeworld as a lived world6;
think, for example, of Eugène Minkowski on lived distance (1930) and lived
time (1933), Erwin Straus on lived movement (1935–36), or Otto Bollnow
on lived space (1956). And certainly any number of introductions to the no-
tion of the “lived body” in the literature on phenomenological psychology
will not only point to the difference between the German words Leib and
Körper7, but will also typically discuss the distinction in terms of the body
of first-person experience on the one hand and the body of natural-scientific
objectification on the other. It would therefore seem simple to understand
the lived body as an experiential body in contrast to a merely physical body
 apprehended as a thing among things8. There is nevertheless considerable
resistance to this—at least on first glance—in the existential-phenomeno-
logical tradition. One classic claim in this regard is to be found in Sartre,
who declares that the body is precisely “lived” and not “known” (“vécu et
non connu”—Sartre 1943, 388), i.e., it is not experienced in its own right,
but is “passed over in silence” (Sartre 1943, 395)—or to think with Mer-
leau-Ponty, it functions anonymously, “absently available” in our dealings
with the world and with others through what Dreyfus has called “absorbed
coping”9. It is this tension, then—not the familiar Leib/Körper distinction,
but the tension between the lived body as the body of first-person experi-
ence and the body that is “lived” but not known—that served as the initial
motivation for my concern with the notion of the “lived” in phenomenolog-
ical description. But there is a deeper motivation at work as well.

Husserl uses the term Besinnung10 to name a radical sense-investigation

6 See, e.g., Straus 1966, xi, on deciphering the “unwritten constitution of everyday life”
and revealing its basic “axioms” (x).
7 Here I cannot go into the origin(s) of the use of this pair of terms to express a technical
phenomenological distinction, nor can I discuss either Husserl’s variations on the distinction
(e.g., Leibkörper) or the various ways in which the Leib/Körper distinction has been
translated in various languages. I shall also set aside issues concerning the constitution of
the body as a thing in space in general, which is a topic for a separate investigation; see,
e.g., Behnke 2010a.
8 Note that this contrast leaves no room for the direct experience of one’s own body as
a physical thing—for instance, as a weight I can hardly drag up the stairs in illness or injury.
9 See, however, Peckitt 2010 for one challenge to this claim.
10 The evocative phrase “absently available” was introduced in Gallagher 1986, 153ff.;
see also Leder 1990, and cf. 38/237f., where Husserl notes in a 1909 text that the thing I
am perceiving is indeed given in a certain orientation to me, but without any perception
of my own lived body (Leib) being necessary. On “absorbed coping,” see, e.g., Sutton et
al. 2011.
11 Calenge 2018, 60, suggests that this term has its origin in Dilthey and indicates how the
latter’s follower Georg Misch takes it up to mean a reflection not “on” experience, but “in”
or sense-explication that transforms a vague or empty sense into the mode of itself-givenness that will allow us to appreciate it in full clarity (17/13). In Formale und transzendentale Logik, for instance, what is to be explicated is “the genuine sense of logic as theory of science” (17/14), a daunting task indeed. My task here may seem even more ambitious—namely, to contribute to clarifying the genuine sense of Erlebnis (lived experience)\(^{12}\), Erleben (lived experiencing), erlebt (lived), and Leben-in / in ... leben (living-in) in Husserl, along with some consideration of his notions of lebendig (living, as in the “living present”) and Leben (life, or more specifically, transcendental life\(^{13}\)) as well\(^{14}\). Here it must be emphasized that the necessary clarifications cannot be carried out on the sheerly verbal level, and certainly not through “defining” words by means of other words (cf. 20-1/310f., 325f.); for example, we should at least consider how the words “work,” what role they are playing, what job they are doing\(^{15}\). Moreover, our task is not just to “cash in” (einlösen—see, e.g., 2/62; 25/32; 20-1/322; cf. 11/22) the “empty” words for the fulfilling itself-givenness of the matters we are talking about, although this is indeed crucial (cf. 17/170)—the word-field does essentially point to an evidence-field and to the typical manners of givenness of that which fulfills the linguistic expression(s). But we must also inquire into the effective constitutive performances involved (17/185, 241f.). And more is at stake than the acts that are currently being carried out, for acts are informed by attitudes\(^{16}\). We must accordingly also consider the sedimented history of all of the intentional accomplishments shaping the current performances (17/252), along with the sedimented world-horizon presupposed experience, an Innewerden. Here, however, I am referring only to Husserl’s understanding of Besinnung.

\(^{12}\) My interest throughout is in Husserl’s phenomenological notion of Erlebnis, not in any natural-attitude account concerning experiences as real events in empirical persons; see, e.g., 24/244f. as well as §§35c, d, e.

\(^{13}\) I am concerned only with Husserl’s own notion of transcendental life (see, e.g., 8/78, 266; 34/123, 136, 157, 158, 160, 165, 174, 180, 181, 227, 296, 299, 300, 319, 452f., 459, 462; 6/188; 29/338), and not, e.g., with that of José Gaos (see Zirión 1995, 26; 2003, 178f.) or with, e.g., the work of Dilthey and Misch (see, e.g., Calenge 2018); Heidegger (see, e.g., Roesner 2012, §4) and Fink (see Bruzina 2004, Ch. 6); Landgrebe (2010, §§56ff.); or Erwin Straus (see, e.g., Bobant 2018).

\(^{14}\) For a different approach to the word-field or “Begriffsregister,” Leben / Er/eiben / Lebendigkeit, see Roesner 2012. In Spanish translations of Husserl, the overall tendency is to use words etymologically related to “life” in translating members of this word-field: “vivencia” for Erlebnis, “vivenciar” for erleben, “vivido” (or “vivenciado”) for erlebt, and “vida” for Leben (Zirión 1992ff.); in the sources I was able to consult, some form of “vivir en ...” is used for in ... leben.

\(^{15}\) The notion of words “working”—including existing words “working freshly” in a way that is not confined to their received sense(s)—comes from Eugene T. Gendlin. For a critical appreciation of some possible parallels and relations between Gendlin’s approach and Husserlian phenomenology, see Zirión 2010, especially, e.g., 97ff.

\(^{16}\) Cf. Jonkus 2020, 107f.: “Language reveals the phenomena themselves by specifying the attitudes through which they are available.”
and perpetuated not only by the familiar fundamental concepts concerned, but also by the other expressions that may be summoned to describe the specific performances and correlates in question (Landgrebe 1959, 255, 257), all taken in terms of the style(s) of experiencing involved in each case. This is obviously not a task that can be completed in a single paper; what follows is in no way an exhaustive documentation and analysis of how the key notions mentioned above function in every period of Husserl’s writings. However, I shall attempt to lay out some dimensions of the problem and eventually to apply these provisional findings to the issue of the lived body as a body of lived experiencing, a task undertaken in the spirit of beginning to overcome the initial naiveté of my own investigations in phenomenology of the body—investigations that simply accepted the notions of “lived experience” and the “lived body” as working notions serving as tools of the trade, as it were, without inquiring into their assumptions and implications. In this way I hope to make at least a modest contribution to the phenomenology of phenomenology, not “from above,” but from within my own ongoing phenomenological work itself (cf. 24/387). I shall begin by contrasting a “topographical” sense of the term “lived” (§2) with an “effectively functioning” sense of the notion of “living-in” (§3) before proceeding to issues related to “reflection,” or more specifically, to the question of possible alternatives to reflection as it is usually understood (§4). Finally (§5), I will bring this research report to a close by offering some remarks about kinaesthetic and somaesthetic experience in response to the question posed by my title.

§2. The “Topographical” Sense of the “Lived”

Why am I terming this sense of the “lived” (erlebt) “topographical”? One reason is that on more than one occasion, Husserl himself turns to the notion of an explorer mapping out an unknown territory as a metaphor for his own phenomenological work. First of all, as he notes early in the 1907 lecture course on “Hauptstücke aus der Phänomenologie und Kritik der Vernunft,” the phenomenological voyage of discovery must arrive safely at the shore of the new land without wrecking the ship on the reefs, and the explorer must be undeterred by the clouds of obscurity that initially veil the territory from view (2/44f.). Once the explorer sets foot on this new land, however,

17 This research report is rooted in an informal survey of how Husserl uses the notions of “lived” and “living-in” in various contexts (works published in his lifetime, lecture courses, research manuscripts), based on my reading of various volumes of Husserliana and Husserliana Materialien and not, for example, on a computer search for the words concerned. The period covered is roughly 1893 to 1937, and my citations are illustrative, not exhaustive.

18 See, e.g., 34/176ff., 295f.; HM8/7, and cf. Landgrebe 1959, 256f.; Kern 1975, 10f.
the initial process of mapping it begins—and this already implies the possibility of subsequent explorers correcting the map and adding more details. Husserl accordingly acknowledges in the 1913 draft of a new preface to the Logische Untersuchungen that even if an initial description is indeed based on seeing the relevant matters themselves, either the explorer or the phenomenologist may fail to make necessary distinctions (20-1/322). Thus the attentive reader of any phenomenological description must not merely follow the sense of the words, but must consult the experiential evidence at stake (20-1/319f., 322f.), “seeing” (Schauen) and describing the matters for oneself, just as a second explorer may not only follow in the footsteps of the first, but may take alternative paths that allow the description to be enriched because new vistas have been brought to light (20-1/325). Later, in a 21.III.1930 letter to Dorion Cairns, Husserl similarly speaks of securing phenomenology as an ongoing communal task and characterizes his own contribution as providing an initial map that predelineates a field of infinite discoveries for future generations (BW4/23). And the 1930 “Nachwort” to Ideen I not only refers to this universal horizon of phenomenological work as a “promised land” (see also 24/445), but claims that its “main geographical structures, so to speak,” have already been revealed (5/161), so that the features seen and described by the original explorer remain standing despite subsequent improvements and supplements in the maps of later explorers who venture into the realm concerned (5/151f.)—the lived experiences, capabilities, and achievements of transcendental life (cf. 5/141).

However, the use of a topographical paradigm is not limited to such seemingly rhetorical strategies19, for much of Husserl’s work is concerned with recognizing “regions” within his overall field of work (Arbeitsfeld) and delineating their main structural elements. Here it is not only a matter of discovering the essential features or basic categories of, and the relations among, the familiar regional ontologies devoted to Ding, Leib/Seele, and Geist20, but also of the characterization of pure consciousness itself as a region (3-1/Zweiter Abschnitt, Drittes Kapitel), although as Landgrebe emphasizes, constituting consciousness is not at all a “region” in the same

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19 In a lovely extended passage from a work published many years ago now, Richard Zaner (1970, 33–37, 39–40) takes Husserl’s motif of the phenomenologist as an explorer of a vast new land quite seriously, and demonstrates in some detail how apt this analogy really is.

20 In static phenomenology, the relations among these three regions is understood in terms of one-sided hierarchical relations of foundation, e.g., the sheer thing is the “founding” stratum and the lived body is “founded” insofar as it is indeed a thing, but one that is “animate” rather than “inanimate” because it has been “animated” by a psyche. (For more on Husserl’s use of the notion of “stratification” in this and other contexts, see Rabanaque 2010, §3). However, as Landgrebe (1963, 158) reminds us, the tripartite scheme mentioned is later compressed into the two regions of Natur and Geist (see HM4/passim; 32/passim), and the relation between them shifts as well.
sense as constituted regions of being.21 Moreover, as he also points out, there are historical roots to the topographical approach as well. In his early treatise on Erleben, he identifies what he refers to as the “psychological” concept of Erlebnis, indicating that as “inner” experience in contrast to “outer” experience (Erfahrung), lived experience amounts to a specific region that can be traced back to Descartes’ distinction between res extensa and res cogitans, with the cogitationes given through inner perception; the task then arises of determining the ultimate elements of this region, leading, for instance, to various versions of sensualism and to the issue of the immediate “impressions” of sensuous data as providing a basis for certainty.22 Now Husserl himself later acknowledges that his earliest descriptions contain some remnants of sensualism (a position he subsequently subjects to critique),23 and his later work on the hyletic takes different directions (a theme I cannot pursue here). But if we remain for the moment with the earlier work, we see that phenomenology itself is initially understood as a sheerly descriptive analysis of the really intrinsic components (reellen Bestände) of our lived experiences (19-1/28n.1 [text of the first edition]; cf., e.g., 23/309). Thus at the beginning of Husserl’s phenomenological journey, what is to be explored is a kind of realm of “immanence” as the region “wherein” the elements really intrinsic to it are to be found. And these really intrinsic components are often characterized as “lived” in contrast to the intentional object, which is “meant” rather than “lived.” We can bring this distinction into sharper focus by considering a certain ambiguity con-

21 See Landgrebe 1963, 147ff.; as he goes on to insist, however, in the case of the “region” of pure consciousness, the term “region” refers to the sphere of a science devoted to it as distinct from the provinces of other sciences (cf. 32/29). The notion of consciousness as a region of “absolute” being (3-1/§49) has nevertheless been criticized within Husserlian phenomenology, e.g., in Seebohm 1992.

22 Landgrebe (2010, §4) contrasts the “psychological” with the “existential” concept of lived experience; here, however, it is not possible to pursue his “existential” sense of the term.

23 See Landgrebe 2010, 25ff.; see also Lohmar 2012, especially 2–15, which addresses the notion of a “reduction” or a “Rückgang” to really intrinsic components of experience, and especially to sensuous data as the moments serving as sources of intuitive fullness (cf., e.g., Landgrebe 1973, 6). On “inner” and “outer” perception, cf. 19-2/751ff.


26 A full exposition of the shifting senses of “immanence” in Husserl’s work is not possible here—see Boehm 1968 on the transformation of the term in Husserl’s development (and see, e.g., 2/4–10, 55, 60ff.). Cf. Behnke 2004, 21f.; Rizo-Patrón de Lerner 2012, 406ff., 419ff., and see also Brough 2008, especially 180f., on the distinction between “real immanence” (reale Immanenz) in the psychological sense and the phenomenological sense of the “really intrinsic” (reelle Immanenz), as well as 185f. on the shift from immanence as a (topographical) “location” to immanence as mode of givenness.
cerning the twin notions of “contents” and “containers.” On the one hand, as the very title of the familiar \textit{Inhalt/Auffassung} scheme\footnote{Here it is not possible to trace the fortunes of this scheme in Husserl’s work from his initial reliance on it (see, e.g., 19-1/397ff.) to his dawning reservations about it (see, e.g., 23/265; 10/7n.1, 269ff.; 16/§18) to its later recurrences (see, e.g., 3-1/§97) and his subsequent deliberations (see, e.g., 33/164ff.). Lohmar 1993–94 suggests (111) that Husserl never provides a fully developed theory of the apprehension of contents, and accordingly attempts (129ff.) to sketch a theory consistent with Husserl’s later work on passive synthesis (and his later understanding of the hyletic) while emphasizing the inseparability of “contents” and “apprehension” and reminding us of the work of Holenstein (1972, §§26–33) on the development of Husserl’s notions of apprehension and apperception.} already tells us, certain elements are characterized as “contents” immanent to consciousness—namely, sensations (though in this model not only sensory contents, but acts are really intrinsic\footnote{However, cf. Pokropski 2015, 96f., on a criticism stemming from a PhD dissertation by Leopold Blaustein (1905–1942?) published (in Polish) in 1928 according to which Husserl is wrong to include both acts, which are \textit{ichlich}, and sensations, which are \textit{ichfremd}, in the category of \textit{Erlebnis}.}). On the other hand, as is well known, Husserl rejects the notion that consciousness is some kind of “container” like a bag or a box\footnote{See, e.g., 19-1/169, 437 (and cf. 385, 388); HM3/114; 10/279; 24/151; 2/12, 71f., 74f.; 36/106, 128; 11/319; 17/363. Cf. 1/17; 11/19; 34/173, and see also Brough 2008, especially 189ff., where the move away from the container model in favor of the notion of constitution is presented as decisive for Husserl’s development.}. He nevertheless does speak of the intentional “content” of an act—namely, the object just as it is meant\footnote{See Heffernan 2015, 80, for problems connected with the terminology of “intentional content” and “intentional object.”}—while explicitly distinguishing the latter sense of “content” from the “really intrinsic” sense (19-1/1LU, §§16f.; see also, e.g., 38/10). Such a distinction clearly indicates how Husserl is mapping the landscape of consciousness using the topographical sense of the “lived,” for the point is precisely to delimit the domain of the really intrinsic from that of the intentionally meant. And this in turn sheds light on the issue of the “lived” and the “known,” or as Husserl already says in a text from 1898, the “lived” contents vs. the “meant” objects (see, e.g., 38/130, 136f.; cf. 86f.). He returns to this point in various passages of the \textit{Logische Untersuchungen};\footnote{See, e.g., 19-1/36n.2, and cf. 360, 399; 19-2/701, and cf. 767.} it also occasionally surfaces in the important lecture course on “Hauptstücke aus der Phänomenologie und Theorie der Erkenntnis” offered in Göttingen in Winter Semester 1904/05 (see, e.g., 38/12; 23/12), although as we shall see, tensions connected with the topographical model do begin to emerge in the time lectures. But insofar as this topographical sense of the “lived” hold sway, “to be lived” is “not to be an object” (“Erlebtsein ist nicht Gegenständlichsein”—19-2/669), even if the lived can indeed become an object of reflection (see, e.g., 19-2/669, 708) rather than serving the function it does when it is actually lived (e.g., of providing the sensuous basis for an apprehension—see, e.g., 19-1/222, 27}
As lived, however, the lived stays on its side of the border between the lived and the meant or known.

Nevertheless, this map of the phenomenological terrain does not hold steady in Husserl's work—in fact, it can be seen to waver and break up in two different ways. The more tenuous and subterranean of these tendencies suggests that what is lived can indeed be known (bewusst) without becoming the object of a consciousness directed toward it; this possibility surfaces even before 1900 and persists for a number of years, but for the most part remains merely inceptual in Husserl's own work (although similar trends can be discerned in the work of others during the period known as “early phenomenology”). I shall defer discussion of this tendency to §4 below. Here, however, I would like to identify the other shift that disrupted the initial map, a transformation that we might see as coming to fruition around the time of the Christmas holidays of the Winter Semester 1906/07 lecture course entitled “Einleitung in die Logik und Erkenntnistheorie.” These lectures are of great significance in Husserl's development, for it is in these deliberations that he first explicitly introduces the notion of the phenomenological reduction and begins to include the intentional correlate in the “breadth” of phenomenological research rather than restricting phenomenological investigations to the topographical region of really intrinsic components (see 24/§38). Moreover, in what for me is a small but telling nuance, he refers to an absolute that is “neither physical nor psychic being in the natural-scientific sense”: we must abandon the seemingly obvious assumption that everything that is given must be either physical or psychic, replacing the notion of regions of being with a phenomenological notion of “givenness” (24/242). And this is one more signal that the “topographical” thinking of the Cartesian tradition that is concerned with “regions” of res extensa and res cogitans is slipping away.

At this point, we are at the 1906 Christmas holidays, and the lectures continue after the break with Husserl's meditations on various sense of “consciousness” (24/§42), comprising consciousness as the unity of lived experiences (Erlebnisse); consciousness as intentional, i.e., being-conscious-of-an-object; consciousness as position-taking; and consciousness as attention. But for my purposes, what stands out is a shift in the notion of the “lived” to mean something more like that which we are “living-in” (a theme I will discuss in more detail in §3 below). As a first approximation of this new sense, consider Husserl's example of looking at the tree that stands before our eyes: what we see is the tree and not the sensations, for the latter are not what we are currently directed-toward (24/243). Yet somehow they are “known” (bewusst), even if they are not perceived—they are “on hand,” as it were, there to be explicitly known (gewusst) if we were to turn to them in reflection. Thus while we are living-in the perception of the tree,

32 For a more detailed account of the role of this course in Husserl’s development, see Ullrich Melle’s introduction to the published version of the lectures, especially 24/xix ff.
33 In 24/§34, Husserl establishes that the epoché is at best a part of a method; the reduction is mentioned at the end of §35c and discussed in §35d as a stepwise process of “suspending.”
34 See 24/xli f., 490ff., on the editorial reconstruction of this part of the lecture course.
this perception—along with all of its components (e.g., the sensuous material, along with moments of attention and apperception)—is “merely” lived (bloß erlebt), and when we do transform this lived-in perception into an object “seen” in reflection, the reflecting itself is merely lived, for it is what we are living-in, not what we are directed toward (cf. 24/244). For Husserl, then, what “lived experiencing” (Erleben) winds up referring to here encompasses everything to be found in the nexus of phenomenological time, but such experiencing is itself non-objective or pre-objective precisely insofar as we are living-in a lived experience and being-directed-toward the objects of that experience rather than making this very intentional experience into an object of a reflection directed toward it (24/247). Or to put it another way, it is no longer a matter of a “map” of the realm of consciousness that distinguishes the region of the lived from that of the meant/known, but of a more dynamic account of how consciousness ongoingly operates in terms of a living-in that functions as meaning-intending without itself being meant. And the latter notion not only comes to dominate Husserl’s further development, but already plays a role before 1907. Let us therefore turn to this notion in more detail.

§3. THE “EFFECTIVELY FUNCTIONING”36 SENSE OF “LIVING-IN”

As early as 1893, in conjunction with beginning to work out a theory of attention and interest, Husserl addresses the distinction between living-in affect, on the one hand, and adopting a reflective theoretical interest on the other (38/165f.), and the contrast between “living-in” and “reflecting-on” persists in writings from many periods. What the notion of living-in connotes most generally is simply carrying out some sort of experiencing—or in other words, experientially adverting-to and being-directed-toward something (cf. 38/377; EU/85f.). However, in most cases, we are free to alter the target we are aiming at and thereby to move from living-in one sort of act to living-in another, shifting, for instance, from living-in straightforward perception to living-in a reflection directed to the perceiving con

35 Note that Husserl explicitly distinguishes the non-“givenness” of the merely lived from that of things we are not attending to in the objective background: “Das attentionale Bewußtsein des Hintergrunds und das Bewußtsein als bloßes Erlebtsein ist ganz zu scheiden” (24/252); the lived sensations are not things in the background (24/243f.), but are moments in the temporal stream of absolute consciousness that do not themselves become given, but are “seen through” by the apperceptions that “animate” them (24/246).

36 In titling this an “effectively functioning” sense, I am thinking of the expression fungierend-leistende that appears in the title of 6/§54a; note that Cairns does occasionally translate leistende as “effective,” and see Cairns 1973, 80, where “productive (or effective) intentionality” is suggested for leistende Intentionalität.

37 Of course, Husserl also uses other language to discuss this contrast; however, I am restricting my survey to passages where he does actually refer to “living-in.”
sciousness (see, e.g., 3-1/77, 201)\textsuperscript{38}. But the act we are currently living-in takes precedence, so to speak, as if thematic primacy can only be granted to one focal target at a time (e.g., we can either live-in the feeling or turn toward it—23/392): what we are living-in cannot simultaneously be meant (24/287), cannot simultaneously be regarded (3-1/162, 164). Instead, if we are living-in, e.g., “S is p,” we see “through” the act of judging this in favor of what this act is directed-toward (26/153). Another sort of example might have to do, for instance, with living-in the apprehension in which we attend not to a photograph as a thing, but to what is depicted (20-1/115; cf. 23/156, 370), or in the case of linguistic expression, living-in the act directed to the signified, not to the sign (19-1/420; 26/18, 23; cf. 30/488). But here too I can change my focus and live-in a direction toward the sign (38/375f.; cf. 17/366f., 368f.) rather than solely attending, for instance, to the \textit{Sachverhalt} that is ultimately meant in my judging. And the very tendency toward a single focus at a time also allows living-in, say, the unity of an object-consciousness whose correlate is the object given, even when we actually perform a series of perceptions that are taken up, as it were, into the unity of the overall performance we are living-in (38/387f.; cf. 19-1/419, 425).

So far, then, living-in can be understood as a performing, a “carrying out” (see, e.g., 23/348; 17/363), and earlier in Husserl’s work it is often one that involves an explicit act of the I (38/263)\textsuperscript{39}. Even (and perhaps especially) thematizing is a “living” activity of the I (\textit{lebendigen Ichaktivität}), i.e., one that “radiates” from the I (38/377; 3-1/178; 17/363f.)\textsuperscript{40}. The most important sense of this as a “living” activity is that it is happening in the primal living present (HM8/353)—indeed, considered in the most original transcendental sense, I myself am “living” by living-in the streaming living present and its primal temporalization (see 34/174f.) But in one passage from 1912, Husserl exploits the metaphor of the “living” to point out that although reflection is built on a straightforward experience such as perceiving this paper, when I am reflecting I am no longer carrying out the latter in “living” fashion—even though the original directedness-toward the paper is preserved (it is still there to be seen), its life is gone: it is “\textit{caput mortuum},” a dead object, while I am living-in the new act of reflection (38/389f.; cf. 391) that makes the perception in question into an object, into something “given” rather than.

\textsuperscript{38} Here I shall not be dealing with issues concerning phenomenological vs. psychological reflection (see, e.g., 27/139ff. on psychological reflection) or natural vs. transcendental reflection (see, e.g., 1/§15); see also Kern 1975, §§7ff., 44ff.

\textsuperscript{39} However, it turns out that the I lives-in any \textit{cogito}, including those characterized as passive—see, e.g., 3-1/70 (cf. 214); 17/364ff.

\textsuperscript{40} It is interesting to note that here all three senses of aktuell identified in Cairns 1973, 4, are in play: the act in question is currently actual in a temporal sense; it is being actualized in contrast to being merely potential; and it is “actional” in the sense that the I is actively engaged, in contrast to something proceeding merely habitually.
than something “performed” (3-1/107; cf. 17/452). Yet as Husserl insists, while I am living-in my reflecting-upon-the-perception, this very reflecting itself remains unthematic, and so on, so that the distinction between the living act and the object it thematizes holds good at all levels.

How, though, does Husserl’s use of the terminology of “living-in” differ from the notion of intentionality in general? It is true that living-in displays the structure of intentional experience (cf. 1/13), but Husserl tends to use the language of living-in whenever a certain “specificity” is at stake, as when he wants to refer to a particular type of experiencing along with its particular type of correlate. Thus, for example, although at times the reference will simply be to living-in “the act concerned” (19-1/390), to “these acts” (with a variety of types of acts mentioned—26/144), or to “possible experiences” and “the experience” (6/284; HM8/66), he frequently speaks of living-in specific sorts of acts in ways that we might term “episodic” (cf. Brough 2011, 39), since—unlike, for instance, the continual underlying efficacy of primal temporalization—I am now living-in aesthetic consciousness and now in practical activity (EU/84), and so on. Occasionally, as in a pair of texts from 1908, he provides lists of possible kinds of acts we might be living-in—not only, for instance, perceiving, remembering, or living-in phantasy, but thematizing, judging, thinking, and theorizing, including seeing, determining, knowing, identifying, distinguishing, and predicating (see 26/21; 36/31). There are also references, for example, to living-in objectivation (26/158, 159) or object-consciousness (10/112); state-of-affairs-consciousness (26/153); understanding an expression (26/37); or questioning and doubting (3-1/242). And sometimes the specificity becomes even more specific, as it were, as with living-in each step of a synthesis (3-1/281) or living-in the consciousness of the identity of a remembered sound and the sound as reproductively produced in phantasy (24/272). However, in other cases, the specificity becomes far broader; for example, Husserl speaks of living-in an attitude of the scientific will to knowledge (17/204; cf. 27/308), of purely theoretical interest (17/387), and of absolute self-justification (27/35)—or even of living-in the epoché (6/246). Thus just as in the case of shifting between this or that type of act, the language of specificity also readily allows us to speak of a transformation from one overall type of consciousness to another (see, e.g., 3-1/263, 271), as when I break through the “normality” of the natural attitude and adopt a phenomenological attitude instead (cf., e.g., 6/214). No matter what mode we are living-in, however, we are occupied with the objects meant, not with our own consciousness (17/116), for we “know nothing” of the latter until we engage in reflection (36/31). But what is the phenomenologist to make of all this?

41 Cf., e.g., 3-1/166 on the need for “second-level” acts to thematize the initial reflection. I will return to the problem of reflection in §4 below.

42 Examples are too numerous to mention; I shall simply provide page references for a selection of typical cases.
In the first place, insofar as one task of Husserlian phenomenology is to contribute to clarifying the theoretical foundations of the positive sciences, we are meant to cast a critical eye upon any science that is living-in the evidence proper to its province without reflecting on the principles pertaining to the sense of this evidence, on the legitimacy of its givenness, and on its objective validity (24/164; cf. 30/322, 329). And such issues necessarily lead, for Husserl, to questions concerning the way in which the scientists themselves may be blind to their own practice: the theoretician is living-in certain motivations and performances, but in self-forgetfulness, since the performing life is not included in the thematic regard (17/20, 354). Yet such self-forgetfulness is not confined to the sciences carried out in the natural attitude; everyday life itself is characterized as a naive living-along-in (Dahinleben) perception, judgment, etc., with no reflection making such performances into a thematic object (see, e.g., 26/81; 30/45, 298; 17/376). The “normal,” self-forgetful style of experiencing life in the natural attitude, then, involves a straightforward direction toward things and processes in a pregiven world (see, e.g., 11/306; 15/389; 6/472) in the naive acceptance of its ontic validity (27/203; cf. HM8/138). We can only be freed from the naiveté and the hegemony of this pervasive thematic attitude through the transcendental-phenomenological reduction (see, e.g., 34/64, 159ff., 489f.; 15/390). And this is far more radical than a reflection that discloses the conscious operations that scientists take for granted in practicing their science: it is not only a matter of an epoché that suspends the naive positing of being in favor of “given as real,” etc., but also of a transcendental reduction that does not merely reveal specific lived experiences, but thematizes transcendental life as a concrete whole, including not only the I and its habitualities, but the objects and horizons that are the correlates of its active and passive performances (cf. HM8/182). It is in this way that we come upon the identical I-center living-in its effective life-stream, functioning not only as the pole of active and affective “lived experiences” as temporalized unities experienced in this stream, but also as the pole of the I’s capabilities (HM8/188, 381; 15/286). And “I” only exist as living-in this streaming life (HM8/31; cf. 1/70, 100f.).

Yet this primal streaming life is not only concealed when I am living-in the natural attitude (cf. 15/388f.), but seems to evade any access at all: just as living-in a particular act is contrasted with thematizing this act, the correlate of thematizing, constituting life is not this life itself, but the objects or objective senses that are thereby thematized (HM8/179), for the thematizing function does not belong to the content of the theme and the experiencing life does not belong to that which is experienced (9/478). How do we know this, though, if such an ultimate intentionality cannot, in principle become an intentional object for us (10/382)? Husserl tells us that we can gain access to the lived, in the sense of the performances we are living-in, through reflection. But this has become a problem for the phenomenological tradition,
and moreover, a problem that seems to undermine Husserl’s entire project. I
shall accordingly sketch some possible responses to this dilemma, for even
if I cannot promise to resolve it once and for all, I can at least indicate some
early intimations of a style of self-awareness that differs from “reflection” in
the classical sense.

§4. The search for alternatives to the problem(s) of reflection

Although it is clear that for Husserl, consciousness—as the effective dy-
namic medium of all experiencing—is indeed accessible to the phenomen-
ologizing I, issues of access—and of alternatives to “reflection” as it is
usually understood—were already arising early in the phenomenological
tradition. For example, Moritz Geiger questions whether feelings can be
observed while we are living-through them; can they be given to conscious-
ness through reflection without being modified? Is there an alternative
to a direct, objectifying intentionality—for instance, an indirect awareness,
as if “out of the corner of one’s eye” (Crespo 2015, 392; cf. 386, 388f.)?
Does Ingarden’s proposal to contrast living-in with a new category of “liv-
ing-through” (Durchleben) offer any hope for a solution? Can there be,
as Lipps suggests, some sort of constant, immediate, and inalienable lived
feeling of “mineness” (cf. Averchi 2015, 233)? Is there any possibility of
a primal “self-illuminating” awareness grounding any subsequent explicit,
reflective awareness, but without yet splitting this primal awareness into
the familiar dualistic pattern of a “subject” facing an “object” over-against the
subject?

And such concerns are not absent from Husserl’s own work. For example,
in an 1893 passage I have already alluded to at the opening of §3 above,
he considers cases of intense affect where I can indeed become an observ-
er, but not a non-participating observer: I have the feeling over-against me
objectively while I am simultaneously living-in it, so that there is a genuine
conflict or tension between what claims me affectively and my attempt to
adopt an attitude of reflective-theoretical interest (38/164f.). Then in 1898,
he writes that the core sensuous content is not only lived (here, in the topo-
graphical sense), but is also “known” (bewusst) in a certain sense, yet with-

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43 See, e.g., 3-1/§§77ff.; 17/185, 240ff., 251; 34/57, 191, 305ff., and cf. Roesner 2012, 69.
44 See Métraux 1975, 147ff.; Crespo 2015, and cf. 3-1/146 on anger “evaporating” when
we try to reflect on it.
45 See Ingarden 1921; 1971, 55f., and cf. Seebohm 1962, 109f.n.24; Cavallero 2016,
241f.
46 Cf. Jonkus (2015, 248, 254f., 258; 2020, 100) on this notion in the work of Vasily
Sesemann (1884–1963). See also Mohanty 1972, 153ff., on a “reflexivity” irreducible to
“intentionality”; Kern 1989, 52ff., 61, on a type of awareness similar to that of an oil lamp
that illuminates itself while simultaneously shedding light on its surroundings; Hoffmann
1997, 103ff., 113f., on “Mitbewußtsein.”
out being “perceived,” for it is not the object meant (38/137). Or in the 1901 formulation (19-1/165), what is “lived” (erlebt) is indeed known (bewusst), but not as the object of a consciousness directed toward it. Instead, as we hear in lectures from 1908, when we are aware of what is “bewusst” but not perceived, we are aware of it in another manner for which Husserl offers not only the word “erlebt,” but also “gespürt”—inwardly felt or sensed (26/168). Such a remark is already prepared in the lectures from early in 1907 already mentioned in §2 of the present paper (i.e., 24/§42): how are the sensations we are not directed toward nevertheless “bewusst” even though they are moments of the lived experience of perceiving rather than of the perceived thing and its thingly background (24/243)? These contents are given in some sort of “primal consciousness” in which they have not yet become objective (24/245), yet even while being merely “lived,” they are somehow “on hand” (vorhanden) pre-phenomenally, as it were (24/244; cf. Niel 2013, 217, 220ff.), for the reflection in which they are subsequently explicitly known (gewusst) or perceived (24/244). Then by the time of Ideen I, Husserl tells us that although the I directs its regard “through” the stream of lived experiences to something other than the I, the non-reflected-upon yet “known” (unreflektiert-bewusste) lived experiences are the ego’s own prior to the reflective modification that makes the stream of lived experiences a matter of explicit knowledge for the I. And there are also some later references to a thoroughgoing awareness of our own conscious life—including our capabilities—prior to reflective thematization (34/209), an awareness achieved by “living-through” our transcendental experience in original evidence.

The seeds for such a mode of awareness, however, are already sown in Husserl’s earlier ongoing meditations on time-consciousness (including some discussions that may stem from 1904 or before, but primarily emerging in texts thought to be written between 1907 and 1911). To begin with, not only is the retentional phase said to be conscious of the preceding phase without making it into an object, but the “now”-phase is primally conscious in its own right without needing a separate act of apprehension.

47 However, in a 1909 text, Husserl indicates that the sensuous content is “bewusst” by virtue of being “umflossen” with act-character, i.e., taken up in the animating act “flowing around it,” as it were (38/235; cf. 264ff.) This is a good example of the way in which Husserl’s models and formulations shift as his investigations progress.

48 “Durch reflektiv erfahrende Akte allein wissen wir etwas vom Erlebnisstrom und von der notwendigen Bezogenheit desselben auf das reine Ich ...” (3-1/168).

49 Husserl refers to the originally “lived-through” (durchlebt) evidence of transcendental experience at 1/177; cf. 101 for another use of durchlebe. However, in his remarks on the Kartesiansche Meditationen, Ingarden criticizes Husserl precisely for not employing the notion of Durchleben used in Ingarden 1921 (see 1/216, 218); see Seebohm 1962, 128 n.101, on their differences, and cf. 138f.

50 A number of different authors also draw upon these (and other) texts in addressing Husserl’s notion of reflection; see, e.g., Ni 1998.
that would bring it to consciousness (10/119); the flow grasps itself in its very flowing without requiring a second flow (10/381; cf. 127). In this way every experience is itself not only “lived” (erlebt), but known (bewusst) precisely as originarily present (10/291), even though such awareness is not the same as meaning and positing an object (10/126)—unless, of course, I turn toward my own flowing life in reflection and single out some element as an intended object “in the strict sense” (10/128f.). Prior to the reflective regard, however, this life itself objectivates but is not objectivated, and “all non-objectivated objectivation belongs in the sphere of absolute consciousness” (10/286), i.e., it belongs to the transcendental life ongoingly functioning in the living present, supporting and enabling all object-constitution without itself being constituted as an object.

Nevertheless, such intimations of a non-objectivating awareness “beyond” or “prior to” the “object over-against a subject” model become submerged as the phenomenological tradition continues. Elsewhere (Behnke 2014) I have traced the development of the interpretation according to which the “operatively functioning” performances of consciousness not only proceed “anonymously,” but do so necessarily. And this discussion not only takes place within, but contributes to a climate of suspicion regarding reflection. For example, reflection modifies what it reflects upon, perhaps most damagingly by turning the subject and its subjective life into an object so that the distance reflection takes from the original living-in enforces a kind of self-alienation. Moreover, the distance is temporal as well: within the stream of lived experience, the act of reflecting is always subsequent to the act reflected upon, so that there is an irrevocable gap between the originally self-temporalizing I and the temporalized I grasped as an object over-against the new, unthematized reflecting I. But since the very performance of the reflection is itself anonymous, afflicted with the same self-forgetfulness as any act I am currently living-in, we are faced with an infinite regress, for we can only seize upon any reflection by carrying out another, subsequent, equally anonymous reflection; thus we can never catch reflection (or indeed, any subjective performance) “in the act.”

For my purposes here, however, one of the most important aspects of this dilemma comes to the fore with Klaus Held’s keen recognition that one of the main structural features of the dilemma can be understood in terms of the visual paradigm that reflection presupposes: “I cannot catch sight of myself and grasp myself because I myself am the source of my own functioning”—I myself “am the grasping regard.” And indeed, one of the

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51 This is, of course, a matter of the well-known “double” intentionality, one constituting the unity of the flow itself, the other the unity of, say, the tone we are hearing; cf. 10/80ff., 116ff. 378ff., and see also Niel 2013, §3.


53 See, e.g., Brand 1955, §13; Held 1966, 9, 40, 63, 74, 81, 131.

54 Held 1966, 120; cf. Sartre 1943, 379—or as Husserl puts it, “Was wir aktuell erleben
structural features of vision is that the seeing eye does not itself belong to the panorama that it simultaneously opens up and holds at a distance\textsuperscript{55}. But in addition, the structure of visual experience involves a preferential central focus, as if the ray of the visual regard (Blick) can only focus on one privileged target at a time, most typically on a “figure” standing out from a co-given but subordinate “ground.” Moreover, vision is inescapably “frontal“: even if I go around to see the thing from “its” back side, what I am now seeing is once again appearing “before my eyes,” and if I turn my head and twist my torso in order to look over my shoulder as I walk down the street, what I am seeing may be “behind” me in terms of the direction of my travel, but is only visible because it is now “in front of” my gaze. Vision, then, separates the seer from the seen, offers only one perspective at a time, and requires that everything it allows us access to must be given in the manner of a “there” in front of a “here.”

This, however, is not only true of reflection, but holds for “straightforward” experience as well, since it too has tacitly been taken according to a visual paradigm so that it is literally a matter of being directed “straight-forward” to an intentional object over-against an experiencing subject\textsuperscript{56}. The very prevalence of visually oriented language may be heard if I now write, for example, that here it is not hard to “see” how straightforward experience automatically precludes a simultaneous central focus on its own performance (cf. Ni 1998, 95f.n.17) and requires a second act—one that bends back the direction of the regard, as it were—in order to make the experiencing that I was initially living-in into the object of the reflective act I am currently living-in (which again must itself remain anonymous until a new reflection makes the first reflection the object of its singular focus, and so on). Thus the very way in which both the “straightforward” and the “reflective“ have been conceived expresses a pervasive visual paradigm that has serious consequences for Husserlian phenomenology: as Held and others have pointed out, under this paradigm, there is what amounts to an essential unthematizability of the living functioning of transcendental life in the living present (see, e.g., Behnke 2014, 23, 26), so that its deep structure remains inaccessible in principle for phenomenological reflection\textsuperscript{57}. But with this, the entire Husserlian project would seem to fail, and must accordingly give way to speculative construction, or to the naturalization of consciousness, or to the work of ... (insert the name of some other philosopher). What are we to do?

..., sehen wir nicht“ (3-1/349).

\textsuperscript{55} Even if we close our eyes, we find that the seen insides of our eyelids are at a small but noticeable distance from the origin of the seeing.

\textsuperscript{56} According to Husserl, the “straight-forward“ frontality holds good not only for perception, but also for phantasy and memory; the word he most often employs for what is experienced in these modes is “vorschweben,” i.e., what is seen in phantasy or memory “hovers before” me.

\textsuperscript{57} Landgrebe 1974, 468ff.; cf. Seebohm 1962, 105f.
In other essays\textsuperscript{58}, I have suggested that these difficulties can be alleviated by shifting from a “separative” visual paradigm to an alternative style of awareness characterized by a “dilated” kinaesthetic consciousness in which I am lucidly living-in the performances and capabilities of my own transcendental life, yet without “losing sight” (as the visual habit would put it) of the intentional correlates of these performances and capabilities (be they “objects” or “horizons”).\textsuperscript{59} Here it is not possible to provide detailed descriptions of this possibility. But I shall at least try to bring my phenomenological exploration to a close by returning to the question of the body that is “lived” but not “known” and by indicating some implications of the notion of a “lucid” awareness as an alternative mode of thematization.

§5. What is lived when we are lucidly living in our own transcendental life?

I referred above to transcendental life as objectivating but not itself objectivated. Yet as John Brough puts it in introducing Husserl’s lectures on phantasy, image-consciousness, and memory, the work Husserl did on time-consciousness from about 1909 to 1911 let him to recognize “the nonobjectivating or nonthetic awareness we have of our acts and contents as unities belonging to the immanent time of consciousness.” And as Brough goes on to point out, “Husserl usually refers to such immanent unities as ‘experiences’ [Erlebnisse], and frequently calls the internal consciousness we have of them ‘experiencing’ [Erleben]” (Brough 2005, lxi; 2011, 28, 36, and cf., e.g., 23/326). Being aware of our own experience in this manner, then, offers an alternative mode of access to the subjective that—precisely as “non-objectivating” and “non-thetic” awareness—avoids the pitfalls of treating the subjective as some kind of “object.” When we think the “non-objectivating” in this way, however,\textsuperscript{60} we are led back to our initial question concerning Sartre’s insistence that the body is lived but not known. And if we inquire into the latter contrast in more detail, we find that Sartre’s non-thetic, “non-positional” consciousness of \textit{le corps-existé} (cf., e.g., Sartre 1943, 395, 399)—the body that is lived, but is not known

\textsuperscript{58} See, e.g., Behnke 1984; 1997, 184ff.; 2003, 46ff., 57; 2008a, 49f.; 2008b, §3; 2016, 45f.; 2018a, 37ff.

\textsuperscript{59} I should emphasize that in contrast to the extensive literature on “pre-reflective self-awareness” (cf., e.g., Zahavi 1999, 2005; Kreuch 2019 on phenomenological and non-phenomenological “reflective” vs. “pre-reflective” theories of self-consciousness), the possibility I am suggesting is not a “pre-reflective” consciousness standing in a founding-founded relation to a corresponding object of subsequent reflective awareness; instead, I am proposing an alternative style of thematization whose experiential structure differs from that of “reflection” as usually understood.

\textsuperscript{60} Here we must set aside the treatment of “non-objectivating” acts in the \textit{Logische Untersuchungen}; see, e.g., Melle 1990.
as an object—displays a certain influence of Gestalt psychology (Mirvish 2010, 68). More specifically, the body as immediately, non-objectively lived or experienced is to be characterized as vague, inchoate, undifferentiated, diffuse, amorphous (cf. Mirvish 2010, 75; Moran 2010, 46), or in other words, it does not meet the criteria for “known objects” insofar as it fails to stand out in the manner of a visual figure clearly profiled against a ground. Without going any further into Sartre’s ontology (or into his motives for characterizing the body as lived but not known), let us take the difficulty of “knowing” the body in terms of the visual model of givenness as a clue to inquire instead into the lucidly lived body. Here I am referring to our own effectively functioning bodily experience as we are currently living-in it, but with the obligatory self-forgetfulness imposed by the visual paradigm lifted, so that we are no longer exclusively occupied with what lies at the term of the intentional arc, yet we are not making the initial experience into a new object through reflection either. Instead, the experiencing is suffused, as it were, with lucid awareness from within in a “dilated” consciousness that encompasses what our living bodily performances are partnering as well as these performances themselves. How might this possibility enrich a phenomenology of the body?

As one example of the kinds of descriptions that may emerge here, let me briefly return to the “topographical” motif whereby the lived body belongs to a “region” (i.e., that of Leib/Seele) as a province or field of work for the science(s) proper to it. If we abstractively set aside the Seele/psychology domain and only consider that of Leib instead, we find that as Husserl indicates, the corresponding science is what he terms somatology, which has two branches—one comprising the natural-scientific investigation of living organisms, and the other dealing with the direct “somatic” perception each researcher has of his/her own lived body (5/8; cf. Behnke 2009b, 12f.). This leads us to Husserl’s notion of the kinds of sensations (Empfindungen) that he calls Empfindnisse (4/§36; 5/118f.), i.e., the special register of sensations that present the unique object, “my own lived body”—sensations that I will refer to as “somaesthetic” sensations. Now if we assume that these somaesthetic sensations are taken up into an apperception allowing them to function as sensuous moments presenting “my body”—not in the manner of an “external” object, but as “inwardly” sensed, felt, lived—then to retrieve the somaesthetic sensations themselves as the theme of our inquiry, we must exercise something like an “apperceptive epochē” that suspends the “apperception-as” moment.61 One result of such an exclusively “aes-

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61 The term “apperceptive epochē” is mine, not Husserl’s, but cf. Cairns 1976, 84ff. (recounting conversations of 1932) as well as HMB/134, 207, and especially 352; see also references in Nachlass texts of the same period (e.g., 42/39; 39/587) to a “hyletic-kinaesthetic reduction” (cf. HMB/52). The point here is that suspending the apperception yielding the object “my own lived body” facilitates the Rückfrage to the hyletic dimension at stake (here, the somaesthetic) and to the kinaesthetic performances and capabilities concerned. See Behnke 2001, 106ff., for more descriptive detail than can be presented.
theological” interest may be a new sense of the “spread” of the phenomenon, “the currently given contentual ‘filling’ of the field of somaesthetic sensations”: the felt body as felt, here and now, may not match the familiar seen shape of my body in the mirror, for the pattern of an overall inchoate “thereness” within which certain somaesthetic saliences make themselves felt on this or that occasion may, for example, seem to have “missing” zones compared to the complete visual figure. Yet this is precisely the phenomenon itself, as given—which can, of course, shift as I move and new areas “wake up,” as it were, in such a way that even the abiding field of possible localized somaesthetic sensations display a certain dynamic liquidity rather than resembling a fixed grid. Moreover, unlike the image in the mirror, the felt body may not have the well-defined “edges” of a figure clearly profiled against a ground; as Michotte already noted in 1946, our experience of what he terms the “tactile-kinaesthetic” body may well feel more like being a moving “amoeba” with indistinct borders, shimmering, as it were, in the ongoing play of subtle “microkineses”—a very different experience from using a microscope to see an amoeba as a distinct visual object (see Michotte 1963, 204; cf. 197). Lucidly lived from within, then, my lived body is not so much a type of thing or object as a fluid, shape-shifting medium with its own distinctive manner of givenness (cf. Behnke 2011, §4). And in this way the evidence of the somatic/somaesthetic side of somatology already begins to bring into question the topographical model according to which the ontological region of the thing automatically serves as the foundation for the “higher” strata, an assumption according to which the body is essentially a special type of extended thing “animated” by a psyche. 62

Meanwhile, however, if we let go of the “topographical” approach in favor of the dynamic efficacy of living-in, turning—in lucid awareness—to the effectively functioning kinaesthetic performances and capabilities of the “body-as-constituting” (Landgrebe 1974, 477, 480; cf. 15/286), we find, for instance, that there are at least two way in which motility—taken as sheer capability for self-movement—interacts with the somaesthetic dimension. 63 1) On the one hand, we find the “localization” of kinaesthetic performances in somaesthetic sensations: “where” and “how” I am moving is registered in the feel of the movement concerned, and here.

62 Much of Husserl’s work tacitly assumes this model of the “psychophysical”; eventually, however, he recognizes the “psychophysical apperception” as an apperception (see, e.g., 34/398f.) For an account and critique of the psychophysical apperception, see Behnke 2008b, §§; 2009a, §2; 2009b, Part One, B; 2011, §3.

63 Although the familiar word “kinaesthetic” fuses the kinēsis and the aisthēsis moments, and although Husserl himself does speak of kinaesthetic “sensations” in earlier work (see, e.g., 16/161), in his later work he emphatically maintains that kinaesthetic performances are not themselves hyletic, although they have hyletic concomitants—see, e.g., HM8/320, 326, 341, and cf. Cairns 1976, 5, 64, 73, 83, as well as Behnke 1997, 183f.; 2018a, 35.

64 Here the “if-then” relation at stake (e.g., “if” I make a fist, “then” it feels “like this”) is to be taken in phenomenological terms, i.e., as a relation of motivation, not causation. Cf., e.g., Behnke 2018b, 97.
felt right now as I move, not as a result of a subsequent reflection. Moreover, with practice, I can appreciate the texture and dynamics of this felt movement with a “dilated” consciousness, inhabiting the movement from within rather than experiencing it according to the model of a “ray of attention” proceed from an ego “in my head” and aimed at a sensation “down there.” Along with this, I may find that instead of something like a “tunnel vision,” where I can only focus on a single privileged “given” at a time, standing out like a figure against a ground, my experience is “polyphonic”—movements simultaneously carried out in different kinaesthetic systems can be experienced simultaneously, with each not only felt in its own right, but sensed in its dynamic interplay with other, co-given kinaesthetic sequences.

2) On the other hand, however, we find that the very correlate of the “how of the givenness” of whatever I may be somaesthetically sensing is what I have termed the “how of the receivingness” on the part of the kinaesthetic moments of the experience as a whole: I can, for instance, tighten up as if to block off the sensation, or I can yield to it, opening around it, generously welcoming it and staying with it (Dabeibleiben), following the feeling as it unfolds. And even if these micromovements or movement tendencies are playing out passively (whether instinctively or habitually), suffusing them with awareness can transform them and allow other ways of undergoing my streaming somaesthetic life to emerge. For example, I may feel my way into a tension that had already been ongoingly in place “non-actionally” (i.e., without the active intervention of the I) and consciously “match” it, lending it my fiat, as it were, and taking kinaesthetic self-responsibility for it. But this restores the act of “tensing” that had been going on without my being aware of it to the status of one kinaesthetic possibility among other possibilities of the kinaesthetic system, and does so in such a way that the tensing in question may loosen of its own accord\textsuperscript{65}. This, however, is more that a matter of releasing a tension, for the very model of a “tension” as a quality of abiding thing or substrate, “my own lived body,” is also at stake. And here too the model of the body as a fixed thing falls away in favor of a kinaesthetic consciousness that is ongoingly functioning as a richly articulated capability-consciousness (cf. Behnke 2018a, §5; 2018b, §2).

Finally, if we then broaden what we are thematizing with our lucidly lived awareness in order to include not only our own moving body but our ongoing interaction with the things around us, we find that just as the somaesthetic sensations functioned, prior to the apperceptive epochē, as “moments”-through-which the sensuously felt lived body is given, everything pertaining specifically to motility—including kinaesthetic capability-consciousness in general as well as particular kinaesthetic performances—functions as “means”-through-which I partner the world. And these means can themselves be informed with lucid awareness in the living present\textsuperscript{66}. Mindful of Husserl’s instruction to “exercise” our phantasy with rich abundance (3-1/148), I shall invent an example to illustrate this point. Imagine that you sit

\textsuperscript{65} See Behnke 1988 and forthcoming, §1; cf. 2009a, §3.

\textsuperscript{66} See Behnke 2018a, 37ff.; cf. Kern 1975, 43f., 47 on such kinaesthetic consciousness as an “inner ‘corporeality’” (innere “Leiblichkeit”) that amounts to a “transcendental corporeality” functioning as the “body-as constituting” mentioned above rather than being given to consciousness as a sensuously appearing object belonging to a mundane ontological region (cf. 15/650ff.).
down to eat, pick up a normal-looking fork, and attempt to spear a tasty bit of food lying on one side of your plate. But as you are feeling-through the fork to the food—for as a tool you appropriate, the fork’s limits effectively become yours, and you know perfectly well when the tip of the fork has met the delectable morsel you were aiming for—something strange begins to happen: you feel the fork buckle as you wield it, since (as it turns out) it is a trick fork mostly made of rubber. Suppose, though, that instead of demanding a “real” fork, you continue to try to use the trick fork’s tines to impale the desirable piece of food, even though both the handle and the tines of the fork are bending and twisting as you make the attempt. At this point, you may well find that you can feel both the movement of the food slipping away from the fake fork toward the edge of the plate and the fork’s own idiosyncratic moves, as well as the quality of its inner texture (pliable rather than firm). You may even find that you are sensing that your own arm is also moving more elastically as you try to compensate for the fork’s unexpected flexibility. In short, with the mode of awareness I am describing, each of the elements mentioned—the supple, maneuvering arm, the recalcitrant rubber fork, and the movement and texture of the tantalizing morsel of food you have not quite managed to capture—can all be appreciated now, in the act and in their interaction as all this plays out in the living present, without waiting for a subsequent “reflection” to disclose them (cf. Landgrebe 1980, 78). And while we are lucidly living in the experience, these elements are not given in the mode of objects over-against a subject; instead, my ongoing kinaesthetic performances (along with their horizons of capability, as well as their practical correlates) are suffused with an originary, non-objectivating awareness that not only marks the experience as “mine,” but grants access to the ichfremd elements as articulated moments within the texture of a living, concrete whole of which I too am a moment. Yet it need not take a startling example such as the one I have provided to illustrate this possibility—it is merely a matter of cultivating an alternative style of thematization that takes its cue from kinaesthetic consciousness rather than from the visual paradigm.

Let me now attempt a provisional summary. In the topographical sense of “lived,” what is lived is not known precisely because the lived (the really

67 Husserl’s own example is feeling the ground at the tip of a cane or a walking stick—see 14/327n.1, 450n.1; cf. 327f.
68 The term Husserl uses for what I have termed “means”-through-which is Durchgang (cf. Behnke 2018a), and his own example of this sort of Durchgang-consciousness (39/629) refers to the kinaesthetic performances involved while lifting a heavy piece of furniture. I myself have never tried to eat with a trick fork, but many similar examples can be found. For example, a violinist who is feeling-through the bow to the string can also gauge, while playing, whether the bow is a little too stiff because the hairs of the bow have been tightened too much—and if I’m in the middle of a performance and cannot stop playing in order to loosen the bow, my awareness can “dilate” to encompass my bowing arm as well while I adjust my gesture to compensate for the less than optimal state of the bow.
intrinsic components) and the known (the meant object as meant) occupy two distinctly different regions of their own on the map. In the effectively functioning sense of “living-in,” the lived is not known because my focus is limited to the intentional object while the performance I am living-in remains forgotten. However, lucidly living-in what I am doing retrieves such performances from their anonymity. Thus what I have termed the lucidly lived body is neither a matter of naively living-along-in an “anonymous” body passed over in the silence of self-forgetfulness, nor of a reflected-upon body standing as an object over-against an observing subject whose efforts to thematize its own performing always arrive too late to catch the effectively functioning body in the act. Instead, the lucidly lived body is available for phenomenological thematization in its very functioning and is revealed as a nexus of powers and possibilities through which world-experiencing life proceeds. Yet the mode of lucid awareness can be adopted in many sorts of phenomenological investigations, not just those concerning the lived body. The question “What is lived when we are lucidly living in our lived experience in the living present of our own transcendental life?” has many answers, although certain answers do show up again and again—notably, Urzeitigung, the ongoing welling-up (Urquellen) of “more” time at the leading edge of the living present, along with the horizontality proper to capability-consciousness of all sorts. In addition, however, no matter what we are investigating, we find that the ever-recurring terrain of our phenomenological exploration is ultimately transcendental life in its full concreteness, i.e., the universal a priori of correlation (6/§46) as the sphere of inquiry proper to transcendental phenomenology, whether it is carried out by reflection in the classical sense or by adopting a mode of lucid awareness from within. I shall accordingly end this particular journey of exploration by fully endorsing the words of Antonio Zirión: “¡A la correlación intencional misma!”69

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